Abstract-This study points out that Zhu et al.'s quantum key agreement protocol (Quantum Inf Process 14(11): 4245-4254) suffers from a collusive attack. That is, two dishonest participants in the protocol can collaborate to manipulate the final secret key without being detected.
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] . After that, several QKD protocols have been proposed. However, in a QKD protocol, the participants cannot contribute equally in order to form the final key. In contrast to the QKD protocols, QKA protocols not only need to achieve the security property but also need to achieve the fairness property. Here, by "Security property" we mean that just the involved participants can obtain the final secret key. And, "Fairness property" denotes that each involved participant can equally contribute their private key to establish the final secret key. i.e. any proper subset of the involved participants cannot manipulate the final shared key without being detected by others. It is obvious that the balance of the participants' contribution to the final key is thus a very serious consideration in designing of any QKA protocol.
In 2014, Shukla et al. proposed two QKA protocols based on Bell state and Bell measurement [2] . The first one is a twoparty QKA protocol and the other one is an MQKA protocol. However, recently, Zhu et al. [3] pointed out that Shukla et al.'s protocol suffers from several weaknesses and subsequently they proposed an improved three-party QKA protocol, which, they claimed, can ensure both the fairness property and security property. However, this article shows that Zhu et al.'s protocol cannot achieve the fairness property.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of Zhu et al.'s protocol. Section 3 analyzes Zhu et al.'s protocol and points out that two dishonest participants in the protocol can collaborate to manipulate the final secret key. Finally, a brief conclusion is given in Section 4.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF ZHU ET AL.'S PROTOCOL [3] In this section, we briefly review Zhu et al.'s QKA protocol, in which three participants Alice, Bob and Charlie are involved using Bell states to establish a secure and fair key. This protocol consists of the following steps:
Step 1 Alice prepares n pairs of ( ) 
Step 2 Step 3 After receiving the authentic acknowledgment of receipt from Bob through the authenticated channel, Alice announces the details of permutation operation 2n A ∏ . Bob picks the decoy photons out and applies Bell measurement on them. If the error rate is found to be within the tolerable limit, they continue to the next step, otherwise they abort the protocol. At the same time, Bob and Charlie check the transmission, Charlie and Alice check the transmission.
Step 978-1-5090-5569-2/17/$31.00 ©2017 IEEE Step Step 7 The same as Step 3. participants check whether there is any eavesdropper exists in the transmissions.
Step 8 
III. PROBLEM WITH ZHU ET AL.'S QKA
According to Zhu et al. [3] , the fairness property of a QKA protocol specifies that all involved participants can equally influence the final shared secret key. i.e. no non-trivial subset of the participants can manipulate the final shared secret key. In this section, we try to show that Zhu et al.'s protocol cannot achieve the fairness property. That is, the final shared secret key can be manipulated by two dishonest participants. Let us assume that Alice and Charlie are these two dishonest participants. In 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This article points out a collusive attack on Zhu et al.'s quantum key agreement protocol, where two dishonest participants can manipulate the final secret key without being detected by the other participants. In this regard, Zhu et al.'s QKA protocol cannot achieve the fairness property.
